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 DEVELOPMENT PLANNING has been described as "a deliberate govern-
 mental attempt to co-ordinate economic decision-making over the
 long-run and to influence, direct and, in some cases, even control the
 level and growth of a nation's principal economic variables (income,
 consumption, employment, investment, saving, exports, imports, etc.) in
 order to achieve a pre-determined set of development objectives."' One
 set of reasons for planning centres round the operation of the market
 system. Thus, market prices are often distorted and can result in a
 misallocation of scarce resources. Another set revolves round the need
 to have a rallying point for local and foreign interests in eliminating
 poverty. A development plan is seen to provide this psychological boost
 for the local population, while to the foreigners it is "proof" that the
 country is serious about development.
 There are basically three types of planning models. First, there are
 the macro or aggregate models which deal with the entire economy in
 such aggregate terms as consumption, saving, investment, exports and
 imports. These are either of the Harrod-Domar type or of a more
 econometric nature. If capital is assumed to be the crucial constraint to
 growth, the former can be used to estimate the saving required to
 achieve a certain target growth-rate for a given marginal productivity of
 capital. If, on the other hand, the shortage of foreign exchange is the
 crucial constraint, then the Harrod-Domar model can be used to
 highlight the role of the foreign sector. Macro econometric models
 consist of a number of equations with the same number of unknown
 variables, with the equations representing the basic underlying structur-
 al relationships of the economy.
 The second general type of planning model is the sectoral model,
 which can in turn be divided into two approaches. The first approach is
 to divide the entire economy into two or more main sectors with the aim
 of formulating an overall plan that is based on the co-ordinated activities
 ' M. Todaro, Economic Development in the Third World (London: Longman, 1977), p. 349.
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 of these sectors. Examples of disaggregation are the division into the
 agricultural and the non-agricultural sectors or the division into the
 consumer, producer, and export-oriented sectors. The second approach
 is a partial one, where each sector or industry is assessed on its own merit
 without reference to the extent of interdependence between sectors or
 industries. This approach is popular among countries which lack statisti-
 cal data and skilled planners. However, it runs the danger of presenting
 a haphazard collection of assorted development projects which appar-
 ently have no connections with one another.
 The third and by far the most sophisticated type of development
 planning is the inter-industry approach, in which the activities of all the
 productive sectors of the economy are linked to one another through a
 set of simultaneous linear equations which express the specific produc-
 tion processes of each industry. This model can be used to estimate the
 intermediate material, import, labour and capital requirements for any
 given target output of a sector and so to produce a comprehensive plan
 with mutually consistent production levels.
 The distinguishing feature of this approach is, therefore, its ability to
 ensure internal consistency. Input-output tables are often used in
 planning specifically for this purpose. However, it is possible to extend
 the technique to include feasibility and efficiency checks, where the aim
 is further to ensure that the production levels are possible with the given
 stock of resources and to see that they constitute the most efficient
 combination.
 It should be noted, of course, that most of the day-to-day investment
 decisions are made at the micro-economic level, with the use of project
 appraisal or social cost-benefit analysis. Macro models may be used to set
 the broad strategies of development, and input-output analysis em-
 ployed to ensure sectoral consistency. However, it is with the use of
 project appraisal that planners ensure the efficient allocation of scarce
 funds between individual projects within each sector. Effective planning
 requires that none of these three stages of planning be ignored. Thus,
 the choice of a correct strategy and the presence of internal consistency
 will be of little avail if projects are badly chosen.
 THE HISTORY OF MALAYSIAN DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
 Seven "development plans" have been published so far in Malaysia.
 Are they plans in the accepted sense? What strategies have they
 adopted? Are they internally consistent? Has project appraisal been
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 used? And how successful have they been in achieving their stated
 objectives? Before we evaluate the seven "development plans," we shall
 describe them briefly.2
 Draft Development Plan, 1950-55
 This was formulated in response to the passing of the United
 Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1945) which provid-
 ed ?120 m. for development and welfare schemes in British colonies
 over the period 1945-56. In 1946, heads of departments were asked to
 submit proposals within the framework of a ten-year development
 programme. The outcome was an estimate of M$542 m. for capital
 expenditure and $98 m. for recurrent expenditure. Over the next two
 years, two committees were set up: first, to select so-called "priority
 schemes" for immediate submission to the Colonial Office for grants
 from the Colonial Development and Welfare funds; and second, to
 allocate these funds between Singapore and West Malaysia. The guiding
 principle in the first task was to finance revenue-producing schemes out
 of loans, annually recurrent expenditure out of revenue and non-
 revenue-producing schemes out of grants from the Colonial Develop-
 ment and Welfare funds. About $43 m. was made available from the
 Colonial Development and Welfare funds to the two territories: West
 Malaysia was allocated $24 m., Singpore $7 m., while the balance of
 $12 m. was to be spent on joint projects.
 The above exercise formed the basis of the Draft Development Plan,
 1950-55, which was described as "an attempt to define the objectives of
 social and economic policy for the period 1950-5, to balance them in
 relation to each other and to plan them within range of the resources
 available to finance them." The plan itself was divided into four parts:
 (1) the development of social services, (2) the development of national
 resources and utilities, (3) the development of trade and industry, and
 (4) a description of the sources of finance. The total capital expenditure
 2 The various plans and reviews of the plans, published by the Malaysian Government
 and printed by the Government Printer in Kuala Lumpur, are: (1) The Draft Development
 Plan of the Federation of Malaya, 1950-5 (1950); (2) Progress Report on the Development Plan of
 the Federation of Malaya, 1950-5 (1953); (3) A Plan of Development for Malaya, 1956-60, or
 The First Malaya Plan, 1956-60 (1956); (4) The Second Malaya Plan, 1961-5 (1961); (5)
 Interim Review of Development in Malaya under the Second Malaya Plan (1963); (6) The First
 Malaysia Plan, 1966-70 (1965); (7) Mid-term Review of the First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70
 (1969); (8) The Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75 (1971); (9) Mid-term Review of the Second
 Malaysia Plan, 1971-75 (1973); (10) The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80 (1976); (11) Mid-term
 Review of the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80 (1979); (12) The Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85
 (1981).
 615
This content downloaded from 137.189.170.75 on Thu, 24 Nov 2016 09:43:55 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Pacific Affairs
 by the government was set at $214.6 m., of which $55.2 m. was for the
 development of social services and $159.4 m. for the development of
 resources and utilities. Recurrent expenditure was estimated to be
 between $22.5 m. and $28.5 m. The projected amount for the develop-
 ment of social services varied from $13.2 m. to $17.7 m., while that for
 the development of resources and utilities was from $9.3 m. to $10.8 m.
 While the Draft Development Plan was being written, the Consulta-
 tive Committee on South and Southeast Asia convened for the first time,
 in Sydney in May 1950. This committee had been established in January
 1950, in Colombo, by the Foreign Ministers of the Commonwealth
 countries in order to accelerate the rate of economic development in
 South and Southeast Asian countries. It was believed that such develop-
 ment was essential to the maintenance of political stability in the area
 and for the growth of world trade and the world economy. One decision
 of the meeting in Sydney was to draw up a programme for economic
 development for the region over the period 1951-56, and invitations
 were sent out to the participating countries to prepare six-year develop-
 ment plans. Non-Commonwealth countries in the region were also
 invited to take part in the exercise. The committee also decided to
 provide funds for a technical assistance programme for the area.
 West Malaysia's contribution to the Colombo Plan was only the Draft
 Development Plan in a slightly modified form, as the original estimates
 for the period 1950-55 were simply projected forward linearly for the
 period 1951-56. An additional capital expenditure of $169 m. for new
 items of development was included, resulting therefore in a total capital
 expenditure of $383.6 m. as against the $214.6 m. in the Draft
 Development Plan.
 First Malaya Plan, or A Plan of Development for Malaya, 1956-60
 The basis of this plan was the report of the IBRD mission which came
 to West Malaysia in 1954, at the height of the Emergency and the decline
 in the boom generated by the Korean War, to guage the economic
 potential of the country. The mission noted that the infrastructure for
 the main export industries, particularly the European-dominated sec-
 tions, was well-developed. It recommended, therefore, that social over-
 head development should be concentrated on the non-export, predomi-
 nantly Malay, rural sector of the economy. It also emphasized the need
 for a massive rehabilitation programme for the rubber industry to
 enable it to compete successfully with the synthetic rubbers industry.
 The mission recommended a public-development expenditure of
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 $778 m. over the period 1955-59. The biggest single item of expendi-
 ture was for rubber replanting ($125 m. or 16.6 per cent), followed by
 $94 m. (or 12.1 per cent) for the construction of roads and bridges in
 basically the non-export sector. The emphasis given to rural develop-
 ment can also be seen in the allocation for other development items.
 The IBRD Report was a great help in the formulation of the First
 Malaya Plan, as it was the first detailed and comprehensive study of the
 problems and the needs of West Malaysia. The plan went along with the
 IBRD mission's emphasis on the need to rehabilitate the rubber industry
 and to develop the rural subsistence sector. It differed from the IBRD
 mission in that it also saw improvements to the tin industry and
 industrial development as being of the "highest priority." Significant
 differences can be seen in the allocation of public-development expendi-
 ture. In terms of the allocation between three broad categories-
 economic, social, and government miscellaneous and unallocated-the
 IBRD mission recommended 62:25:13, while the plan's suggested ratio
 was 60:30:10. In terms of the overall level of expenditure, the plan
 increased the IBRD Report recommended figure of $778 m. by nearly
 48 per cent, to $1,149 m. This was to take care of the expected increase
 in the cost of construction and in the expenditure for certain "priority"
 items. The plan was dominated by the defence and security sector and
 the need of finding the revenue to finance the Emergency expendi-
 ture-problems aggravated by the decline in the prices of rubber and tin
 in the aftermath of the Korean War boom.
 Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65
 This was formulated with technical assistance from the IBRD and
 was conceptually more satisfactory than the previous plans in being
 more than an aggregation of separate departmental expansion pro-
 grammes. The objectives, in the order in which they were given, were an
 improvement in the rural standard of living, the provision of greater
 employment opportunities and a faster rate of economic growth, the
 diversification of agricultural and industrial activities, and an expansion
 of social overhead facilities. The planning technique used was the
 incremental capital-output ratio one, where the investment requirement
 is calculated on the basis of the desired rate of growth of output and a
 given incremental capital-output ratio (ICOR). With a target rate-of-
 increase of 22 per cent in the total output over the period 1961-65, and
 an ICOR of 4, the investment ratio was estimated at 18 per cent or
 $5,050 m.-an increase of nearly 67 per cent over the actual amount
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 invested over the preceding five years. In terms of the investment ratio,
 it involved an increase from 12 per cent to 18 per cent.
 The public sector was expected to spend $2,150 m., or more than
 twice the amount of the actual public development expenditure of the
 previous five years. The private sector was expected to invest the other
 $2,900 m., which again represented a substantial increase (40 per cent)
 over the level achieved under the First Malaya Plan, 1956-60. The bulk
 of this increase was projected to take place in the manufacturing, road
 transport, construction, and commerce sectors. The highest rate of
 increase in output was expected to take place in the construction
 industry (79 per cent), and the lowest in the agricultural and other
 services sectors (15 per cent). The other sectors into which the economy
 had been divided-the mining and manufacturing sector, the transport
 and utilities sector, and the government services sector-were projected
 to grow at the rates of 36, 24, and 22 per cent, respectively. The level of
 employment was expected to go from 2,215,000 to 2,555,000 jobs, an
 increase of 15 per cent. The construction industry was projected to
 increase its intake of labour fastest (75 per cent), which was in line with
 the projected increase in output, though a slight employment lag was
 assumed. The overall employment lag was expected to be much higher,
 as the percentage increase in employment was assumed to be only 68 per
 cent of the percentage increase in output.
 First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70
 Before the formation of Malaysia in September 1963, each of the
 three component states-West Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak-had its
 own development plan. The First Malaysia Plan was the first integrated
 plan for the three regions. It was also the first phase of a twenty-year
 Perspective Plan and presented the short-run measures of the govern-
 ment to solve the economic and social problems of the country within a
 broad and long-run strategy of economic development. The stated
 objectives and the planning technique adopted were basically the same
 as those in the previous plan. The fundamental aim was the creation of
 an environment in which all three ethnic groups could live in dignity and
 harmony. This was to be achieved through a faster rate of economic
 growth, the creation of greater employment opportunities, and a
 reduction in the relative economic imbalance in the distribution of
 income and wealth. Economic diversification, infrastructural develop-
 ment and family-planning programmes were simply operational devices
 to bring about the fundamental objective.
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 The technique used was primarily the ICOR approach. The real
 gross national output was projected to grow by 4.9 per cent per annum,
 or 24 per cent over the period 1966-70. With an assumed ICOR of 3.9,
 investment was set at $9,730 in., or 19 per cent of the gross national
 product. The private sector was expected to be the "engine of growth";
 its share of the investment was $6,160 in., the bulk of which was to take
 place in the industrial sector and its related trades. The traditional areas
 of estate planting and replanting, dwellings and commercial buildings,
 and mining equipment were scheduled to play a smaller part. The aim
 was to create a level of investment which would increase from $1,010 m.
 in 1965 to $1,400 m. in 1970, consisting of a constant level in the
 perennial crops sector, a 5 per cent annual increase in housing invest-
 ment, and a 10 per cent increase per year in the other areas. The target
 of $6,160 m. represented an increase of about 40 per cent over the level
 achieved in the preceding five years.
 The share of the public sector in the programme was $3,570 m.,
 projected at an average annual level that was only equal to the 1965 level
 of about $715 m. The dominant factor in determining this relatively
 conservative target for public capital-formation was the tight financial
 position of the public sector. A shortage of administrative and imple-
 mentational capacity in the East Malaysian states was also a problem.
 Employment was projected to increase by 377,000 jobs in West
 Malaysia and 84,000 jobs in East Malaysia. If the target was reached in
 West Malaysia, the rate of unemployment would be reduced from 6.0
 per cent in 1965 to about 5.2 per cent in 1970. The employment lag
 would be slightly smaller than that projected for the Second Malaya
 Plan, as the percentage increase in employment was assumed to be only
 62.5 per cent of the percentage increase in output.
 The objective of a more equitable distribution of income and wealth
 was to be achieved through the provision of better rural infrastructural
 facilities and the establishment of land-development schemes. Malay
 participation in the commercial and industrial sectors was planned only
 on a very minor scale.
 Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75
 The formulation of this plan was influenced very significantly by the
 civil disturbances of May 1969, which revealed that under the apparent
 calm and prosperity there was a strong undercurrent of discontent in
 West Malaysia. Consequently, the plan gave highest priority to achieving
 a more even distribution of income and wealth. Its New Economic Policy
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 aims at the eradication of poverty by raising income-levels and increas-
 ing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race.
 The New Economic Policy also aims at accelerating the process of
 restructuring the Malaysian society to correct the economic imbalance,
 so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with
 economic function.
 The New Economic Policy consists, therefore, of two prongs. The
 first-the poverty prong-aims at increasing the access of the poor to
 land, physical capital, training, and other public amenities. By increasing
 the quantity and the quality of the factors of production at the disposal
 of the poor, it is hoped that the incidence of absolute poverty will be
 reduced substantially. The second prong-that of restructuring-aims
 at reducing the dependence of the Malays and other indigenous people
 on subsistence agriculture and seeks to increase their role in the modern
 rural and urban sectors of the economy. These changes are projected to
 occur over a twenty-year Perspective Plan period, 1971-90, and the plan
 was the first in a series of development plans to be formulated and
 implemented over this period.
 In operational terms, the restructuring prong has two explicit quota-
 goals. The first is that employment by sector should approximate more
 the racial composition of the population: 54 per cent Malay and other
 indigenous people; 35 per cent Chinese; 10 per cent Indians; and 1 per
 cent others. The second is that by 1990 the Malays and other indigenous
 people should own and manage a share of at least 30 per cent of the
 capital of the corporate sector (as compared to the 2.4 per cent share in
 1970). The share owned and operated by other Malaysians is to increase
 from 34.3 per cent to 40 per cent, while that by foreigners is to drop
 from 63.3 per cent to 30 per cent.
 A growth rather than a redistributive strategy is to be adopted in
 eradicating poverty and in restructuring society. As far as the eradica-
 tion objective is concerned, this means that policies will be pursued to
 ensure the compatibility of growth and equity objectives. As far as the
 restructuring objective is concerned, this means that the increase in the
 Malay share of corporate capital is to be brought about by the active
 participation of Malays in an expanding output, not by the redistribu-
 tion of the existing output. Likewise, the restructuring of the labour
 force is to be effected by the active participation of Malays in the new
 employment opportunities generated by economic growth, not by the
 displacement of existing non-Malay workers.
 The gross national product in 1965 prices was expected to grow by
 6.8 per cent per year. No mention was made of the ICOR approach to
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 planning. The aggregate level of planned investment was $12,150 m.,
 which was 16.6 per cent of the gross national product. This sum was
 about 48 per cent greater than the level actually achieved over the
 period of the First Malaysia Plan. The private sector was expected to
 contribute $7,843 m., as compared to the $5,051 m. actually invested in
 the preceding five years-an increase of over 55 per cent. The contribu-
 tion of $4,307 m. from the public sector represented an increase of
 nearly 37 per cent over the level actually invested in the period 1966-70.
 Employment was projected to increase by 596,000 jobs at an average
 annual growth-rate of 3.2 per cent. The labour force was expected to
 increase at the same rate to produce 645,000 additional workers. The
 number of people unemployed was therefore expected to increase by
 49,000, and the rate of unemployment to be held at no more than its
 1970 level of 7.3 per cent of the labour force.
 In contrast to the First Malaysia Plan, the government was expected
 to take a more active and direct part in reducing the economic disparity
 between the Malays and the non-Malays. Land development would be
 stepped up with greater Malay participation in commerce and business
 actively encouraged, either through a more determined implementation
 of existing policies or through the establishment of enterprises for
 Malays by such statutory bodies as PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional
 Berhad). In the past, the programme to encourage Malay participation
 in the modern urban sector concentrated on the provision of education-
 al and credit facilities. Equipped with paper qualifications and some
 capital, the aspiring Malay "entrepreneurs" had been left to fend for
 themselves in a highly imperfect market system. This passive pro-
 gramme had failed, and the government had now decided to play a
 more direct and active part in its programme to place 30 per cent of the
 commercial and industrial activities under Malay management and
 ownership by 1990.
 Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80
 This is the second of four 5-year plans designed to implement the
 objectives of the New Economic Policy. The strategy adopted is the same
 as that of the Second Malaysia Plan, which is to reduce the incidence of
 poverty and to restructure society through a growth rather than a
 redistributive strategy.
 The target set for the real GDP was 8.5 per cent per annum, and it
 was anticipated that growth would be concentrated in the first part of
 the plan period, as external demand would be weak from 1978 onward.
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 The main source of this growth was expected to come from the private
 sector, with exports and private investment playing the dominant role.
 This was in contrast to the position in the Second Malaysia Plan, where
 public consumption and investment were the principal sources of
 growth in output.
 Employment was planned to increase by 743,000 jobs, thereby
 reducing the unemployment rate from 7.0 per cent to 6.1 per cent. The
 bulk of this increase was scheduled to come from the manufacturing,
 public administration, wholesale and retail trade, and agricultural sec-
 tors, in descending order of importance. This increase in employment
 was expected to provide for 41 per cent of the increase in real GDP of
 8.5 per cent per annum.
 EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENT PLANS
 Draft Development Plan, 1950-55, and First Malaya Plan, 1956-60
 The above plans were no more than aggregations of the expansion
 programmes of separate governmental departments. The planning
 procedure was simple. Each government department was requested to
 submit its own claim for recurrent and development expenditure. The
 total of these claims would normally exceed the funds available, and a
 committee, acting under certain unwritten rules and criteria, would
 reduce the sum total of the claims until it equalled that of the funds
 available. These were, therefore, partial plans which were formulated
 with no regard for internal consistency. Moreover, the method by which
 the respective claims of the government departments were reduced to
 achieve equivalence between funds demanded and funds available left
 much to be desired. Priorities were not stated, nor were ground rules
 laid. Under such conditions, the scope for haphazard decisions based on
 non-economic considerations was very wide.
 At the same time, the implementation of these plans, which were
 meant to spearhead the economic development of the country, was often
 delayed and, in certain cases, even halted because of the needs of the
 Emergency. This was especially true of the Draft Development Plan,
 whose duration coincided with the most intensive period of communist
 activities. Over the period 1950-53, the total expenditure on defence,
 internal security services, and the Emergency came to $640 m.-nearly
 41 per cent of the total expenditure of the federal government. Scarce
 skilled personnel had also to be diverted to Emergency duties. Technical
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 and administrative departments were already greatly understaffed for
 normal duties over this period, yet some of them had to release members
 of staff for work connected with the Emergency. For example, in 1951
 forty technicians and twenty Malayan Civil Service senior officers had to
 be temporarily seconded for Emergency duties. Such diversion of
 human resources from the developmental effort delayed and sometimes
 even prevented the implementation of the Draft Development Plan.
 Unfortunately, it is not possible to substantiate this claim directly with
 empirical evidence, as there are no published data on the rate of
 implementation either for the overall or the sectoral level of public
 development expenditure. However, an interim report on the Draft
 Development Plan over the period 1950-52 did emphasize the delays
 and the disruptions caused by the Emergency, and there is no a priori
 reason for believing that the situation over the second part of the plan
 period was any better.
 The implementation of the First Malaya Plan was also affected by the
 Emergency, as many backlogs of administrative work-such as the
 applications for land for industrial development-had to be cleared.
 However, compared to the period of the previous plan, the overall
 impact of the Emergency was relatively slight. Actual public develop-
 ment expenditure amounted to $970 m., or some 85 per cent of the
 target level of $1,150 m. This represents, in fact, quite a remarkable rate
 of implementation, especially in view of both the unavoidable adjust-
 ments in the government machinery after independence in 1957 and the
 unforeseeable world-wide recession in 1957-58, which reduced govern-
 ment revenue considerably.
 Thus, as far as the overall rate of implementation of the development
 programme of the public sector is concerned (and this, in substance, was
 the First Malaya Plan), the plan can be said to be a success. In terms of
 the expenditure by sector, Public Works Department plant and equip-
 ment (181 per cent) and utilities (111 per cent) had the highest rates of
 implementation. They were followed by transport (93 per cent), agricul-
 ture (86 per cent), communications (82 per cent), industry (77 per cent),
 social services (65 per cent), and general activities (52 per cent).
 The total gross investment over the period of the plan was $3,000 m.,
 or about 12 per cent of the total income. The private sector, therefore,
 accounted for about 60 per cent of the total investment, which repre-
 sents a substantial increase over the private investment undertaken in
 the preceding five years. The bulk of this increase occurred in the
 manufacturing sector as a result primarily of the investment incentives
 provided under the Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1958. The agricul-
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 tural sector, particularly the rubber industry, responded rapidly to the
 development programme. Financial assistance from the replanting cess
 on smallholder rubber (Fund B of the Rubber industry Replanting Fund
 Ordinance 1952) and other government assistance resulted in 308,000
 acres being replanted and 86,000 acres being newly developed. The
 estates responded even faster, for they replanted 357,000 acres and
 developed 79,000 acres. As a result of all these activities, the acreage
 under high-yielding materials increased from 30 to 46 per cent of the
 total acreage over the plan period.
 In its review of the First Malaya Plan, the Second Malaya Plan
 pointed out that rough estimates of the total output of goods and
 services over the period 1956-60 showed an average arithmetic growth-
 rate of 4.0 per cent per annum. This was faster than the corresponding
 growth-rate of the population, so that the per capita income went up by
 an average of 0.7 per cent per annum. The respective average com-
 pound rates of growth were 3.7 per cent and 0.6 per cent. These rates of
 increase, while respectable in themselves and relatively high compared
 to those achieved in other less developed countries, probably underesti-
 mate the achievement of the First Malaya Plan. It should be remem-
 bered that the plan's two major aims were the rehabilitation of the
 rubber industry and the provision of more and better physical amenities
 to the rural sector. Both programmes were successfully implemented;
 but, as their gestation periods were much longer than five years, the
 benefits were not reflected in increases in the GDP over the period
 1956-60. In any case, the First Malaya Plan did not contain any forecasts
 regarding income growth.
 To sum up, the Draft Development plan and the First Malaya Plan
 were constructed without adequate knowledge of planning techniques.
 They were basically development programmes for the public sector,
 formulated without any check for internal consistency. No attempt was
 made to relate capital requirements of both the private and the public
 sectors to target levels of such variables as income and employment.
 However, if they are assessed within this narrow framework-that is, as
 public development programmes-then they were carried out quite
 satisfactorily, especially in view of the heavy demands of the Emergency.
 Second Malaya Plan, 1961-65
 This document was superior to its two predecessors both in presenta-
 tion and technique. It contained four chapters which were laid out in a
 systematic way. Thus, it started with a review of the progress made
 under the First Malaya Plan, following up with an analysis of the
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 prevailing problems of the country and a statement of the objectives of
 the current plan. The financial resources required for the fulfillment of
 these objectives were then estimated and possible sources of funds
 examined. This presentation was in sharp contrast to that in the First
 Malaya Plan and the Draft Development Plan, where both the style and
 the logical sequence left much to be desired.
 An aggregate Harrod-Domar model was used to estimate the level of
 investment required to achieve the target output growth-rate of 22 per
 cent over the five-year period. Ignoring population growth, the rate of
 growth of a Harrod-Domar economy is g = s/k, where s is the rate of
 saving and k the marginal or incremental capital-output ratio. With a
 target annual rate of growth of g equal to 4.4 per cent and a k equal to 4,
 the rate of saving works out to be 17.6 per cent of the total output, or
 $5,050 m. in terms of value.
 This approach to planning was conceptually more satisfactory than
 that adopted in the preceding plans. It gave direction to the develop-
 ment effort firstly in identifying overall objectives and secondly in
 presenting some of these in numerical form. It also provided an
 objective basis for the allocation of public development expenditure
 between the various government departments, thereby avoiding the
 scramble for funds under the previous system. The use of the Harrod-
 Domar model also enabled the requisite level of private investment to be
 estimated. Although this is often derived as a residual, its inclusion as a
 target provided the planning authorities some picture of the role of the
 private sector. In a country such as Malaysia, where there is a large
 private sector, this inclusion is important.
 The Second Malayan Plan, again unlike its predecessors, had an
 employment target. This was set at 340,000 additional jobs-an increase
 of 15 per cent which corresponded to that expected of the labour force
 over the plan period. The target was estimated on the assumption that a
 one per cent increase in output would produce a 0.68 per cent increase
 in employment.
 The plan was successful in several regards. The private investment
 target of $2,150 m. was exceeded by some $500 m., while the rate of
 implementation in the public sector was over 123 per cent. The plan also
 achieved its stated overall objectives. For example, the annual growth-
 rate of the GDP at constant prices was 6.4 per cent against the target
 growth-rate of 4.4 per cent. The revised target-number of additional
 jobs was 326,000, while the actual number created was 344,000; as a
 result, the rate of unemployment was kept at the 1960 level of 6.0 per
 cent. More facilities were provided and opportunities created to improve
 the economic and social well-being of the rural population. Thus, the
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 completion of a large number of irrigation and drainage schemes
 increased the area of rice under double-cropping from 38,000 to
 193,000 acres. The rubber replanting scheme enabled 50 per cent of the
 smallholder acreage to be under higher-yielding seeds by the end of the
 plan period. At the same time, medical and educational facilities in the
 rural areas were improved.
 The Second Malaya Plan is open to two kinds of criticism. The first
 concerns the relevance of the Harrod-Domar model for planning in less
 developed countries, especially those with large foreign-trade sectors.
 The Harrod-Domar model assumes that shortage of capital is the crucial
 bottleneck to economic growth-an assumption that is not borne out in a
 number of less developed countries, and certainly not in Malaysia. If the
 country involved has a large export sector-as does Malaysia-the
 usefulness of the model is in even greater doubt, for then the fate of the
 economy is determined largely by exogenous factors. It should also be
 noted that capital requirements for a given target income-growth are
 determined, under the Harrod-Domar model, on the basis of a given
 ICOR. Malaysia, like many other less developed countries, is undergoing
 rapid technological and social change, so that the marginal productivity
 of capital is changing all the time. It should, therefore, come as no
 surprise that predictions based on the Harrod-Domar model are often
 inaccurate.
 The second area of criticism concerns the employment and the
 equity objectives. Though the plan succeeded in fulfilling its employ-
 ment target, the rate of unemployment was still at a relatively high 6 per
 cent. In all probability, the actual rate of unemployment was higher than
 6 per cent, because the use of Western-oriented concepts of employ-
 ment, unemployment and underemployment in Malaysian conditions
 tended to underestimate the seriousness of the problem. To the extent
 that the provision of rural infrastructure had improved the health and
 living conditions of the rural population and had provided cheaper and
 easier access to the market, the government might have felt justified in
 claiming that it had increased the standard of living of the rural people.
 However, it can easily be argued that many of the benefits of this
 indirect approach had accrued to the middlemen who controlled not
 only the sale of agricultural products, but also the goods purchased by
 the farmers.
 First Malaysia Plan, 1966-70
 This plan was also based on the aggregate Harrod-Domar model, so
 that the criticisms directed at this model of planning in connection with
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 the previous plan are also applicable here. Our evaluation will therefore
 be concentrated on the fulfillment of planned development expenditure
 and achievement of overall objectives such as income and employment.
 The total investment was $8,204 m., which was about 15.6 per cent
 short of the target of $9,730 m: private investment amounted to
 $5,050 m., about 18 per cent below the target of $6,160 m., while pub-
 lic investment was $3,153 m., some 12 per cent short of the target of
 $3,570 m. In terms of public development expenditure-which is public
 investment plus expenditure on defence, purchase of land, loans and
 grants to the private sector, and expenditure on the creation of physical
 assets owned by the private sector-there was only about a 7 per cent
 shortfall ($4,242 m. as against $4,551 m.) Although investment targets
 were not achieved, the rate of growth in output was greater than
 projected. Thus, while the plan envisaged that the GNP in constant
 prices would increase by 4.9 per cent per annum, the rate achieved was
 about 6.0 per cent per annum-from $8,637 m. in 1965 to $11,537 m. in
 1970. At current market prices, the GNP rose at 6.5 per cent per annum
 as against the target of 4.8 per cent per annum, in spite of a fall in the
 prices of the country's major export-commodities.
 The failure of the plan to predict the growth of output accurately was
 due to the insensitivity of the Harrod-Domar model to external factors.
 The "engine of growth" over the period of the plan was expected to be
 the domestic sector. Against all expectations, however, it was the export
 sector which spearheaded the growth of the economy. On the whole, the
 prices of the country's major export-commodities did not decline as
 much as projected, and the output of practically all these commodities
 was higher than estimated. The result was that the value of merchandise
 exports increased at 6.3 per cent per annum as against the plan's
 forecast of 0.6 per cent per annum. The error in forecasting the growth
 of output was "painless," insofar as the planned target was smaller than
 that actually achieved. However, the same could not be said of the target
 for employment. The number of jobs created in West Malaysia was
 350,000 as against the target of 377,000. At the same time, the labour
 force increased by 420,000 compared to the plan's estimate of 377,000.
 As a result, the rate of unemployment rose from 6.0 per cent in 1965 to
 8.0 per cent in 1970. The plan had anticipated a decline from 6.0 per
 cent to 5.2 per cent. For Malaysia as a whole, the rate of unemployment
 increased from 6.0 per cent to 7.3 per cent.
 The programme to bring about a more equitable distribution of
 income and wealth was generally felt to have been largely ineffective.
 There are no reliable statistical data to substantiate this claim, but the
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 Second Malaysia Plan did admit that the relative economic imbalance
 between the Malays and the non-Malays had not been reduced signifi-
 cantly, if at all.
 Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-75
 (1) Economic Growth. The GDP, at factor cost, grew by 7.4 per cent
 per annum in real terms, exceeding therefore the original target of 6.8
 per cent, but falling short of the revised target of 7.8 per cent set in the
 Mid-Term Review (1973). This shortfall was largely due to the impact of
 the worldwide recession on the Malaysian economy during 1974-75.
 While the average annual growth-rate of the real GDP was 8.4 per cent
 over the period 1971-74, it was only 3.5 per cent in 1975. As the Mid-
 Term Review was published in 1973 (before the increase in the price of
 oil), and as the openness of the Malaysian economy makes it highly
 vulnerable to external forces, the small shortfall, against a revised higher
 target, could hardly be called a failure in planning.
 The main impetus for the growth, by expenditure, came from public
 investment and consumption. The growth-rate of public investment, at
 17.6 per cent per annum, was by far the fastest source of final demand.
 (The corresponding growth rate under the First Malaysia Plan, 1966-
 70, had been only 1.9 per cent per annum.) As a result of this rapid
 increase, the share of public investment in the GNP rose from 6 to 9 per
 cent, while its share in the gross capital formation grew from 28 to 49
 per cent. Public consumption increased by 9 per cent per annum and, as
 a result, its share in the GNP went up from 16.4 to 17.9 per cent. In
 contrast, private consumption grew at 3.8 per cent per annum and
 private investment by 7.2 per cent per annum.
 Thus, the target set for economic growth was achieved-and
 achieved under quite difficult circumstances. But how successful was the
 plan in fulfilling the twin objectives of the New Economic Policy?
 (2) Poverty Eradication. In 1970, 49.3 per cent of all households in
 Peninsular Malaysia were below the poverty line. The majority of these
 poor households (73.6 per cent) were in the rural areas, and most of
 these were found among rubber smallholders (28.6 per cent), "other
 agriculturalists" (16.0 per cent), padi farmers (15.6 per cent), and estate
 workers (7.5 per cent). The incidence of poverty in the agricultural
 sector was 68.3 per cent, as compared to the 27.8 per cent in the non-
 agricultural sector. The highest incidence of poverty was recorded
 among "other agriculturalists" (91.8 per cent), followed closely by padi
 farmers (88.1 per cent), fishermen (73.2 per cent), and rubber small-
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 holders (64.7 per cent). Among non-agricultural households, the highest
 incidence of poverty was only 36.7 per cent; this was found among
 households in the utilities sector. It would seem, therefore, that policies
 to eradicate poverty in Peninsular Malaysia must be directed largely at
 the rural population. Very much the same conclusions can be made
 about eradicating poverty in Sabah and Sarawak. The available evidence
 suggests that most of the poor households are located in the rural areas
 and that the incidence of poverty among these is very high. As in
 Peninsular Malaysia, therefore, programmes to eradicate poverty in East
 Malaysia must concentrate on the rural areas.
 The actual policies adopted to eradicate poverty in the rural areas
 over the plan period, 1971-75, were basically the same as those of the
 earlier period. They emphasized land development, the provision of
 drainage and irrigation facilities to increase the planted padi acreage,
 the supply of electricity, and so on. In other words, the programmes
 sought to increase the quantity and the quality of the factors of
 production available to the rural population. The result was a decrease
 in the incidence of poverty in all but one of the agricultural sub-sectors-
 namely, the estate workers, the majority of whom were rubber-tappers
 whose wages were tied to rubber prices. Over the period 1970-75,
 rubber prices rose more slowly than the consumer price index, causing a
 decline in these workers' real standard of living. For the agricultural
 sector as a whole, however, the incidence of poverty decreased from 68.3
 to 63.0 per cent.
 Two types of criticism can be made against the programme to
 eradicate rural poverty. The first is that the land-development pro-
 gramme per se does not tackle the existing structural weaknesses of the
 agrarian economy. The second criticism concerns the format of the land
 development programme of FELDA (Federal Land Development Au-
 thority), the most important of the various land development schemes in
 Malaysia. FELDA was set up in 1956 with the aim of providing land for
 the landless through the establishment of comprehensive land schemes.
 Even though there have been changes in policies over the years, FELDA
 still conforms largely with its original format of land development-
 namely, to establish schemes of between 4,000 and 5,000 acres each,
 plant them with rubber or oil palm, and provide them with water,
 dwellings, schools, health centres, drainage and irrigation, processing
 plants, roads, and road links with the main highways. Each scheme is to
 accommodate 400 families. If the main crop is rubber, then each family
 will have ten acres, eight of which will be planted with rubber and the
 rest with rice or fruit trees. If the preference is for oil palm, then each
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 family will be provided with twelve acres, ten of which will be planted
 with the main crop. The work of jungle clearing, development of the
 site, planting of the main crop, construction of the house, and mainte-
 nance of the agricultural area between the establishment of the main
 crop and the time when the settlers take up residence, is carried out by
 contractors.
 The FELDA programme is criticized for being much too comprehen-
 sive and rigid. A much larger number of landless peasants would have
 been settled had the government simply designated suitable areas of
 land for farming and limited its role to the provision of economic and
 social overheads. At the same time, the rigid format of FELDA schemes
 means that the more enterprising settlers are hindered from expanding
 the scope of their operations, while the less enterprising ones have to
 bear a heavier than intended repayment load.
 The programme to eradicate urban poverty is highly dependent on
 the programme to erase rural poverty. Failure of the latter will further
 widen the gap between urban and rural incomes and increase the rural-
 urban flow. By itself, the expansion of urban employment cannot reduce
 the flow and so reduce the incidence of urban poverty; it may, in fact,
 paradoxically increase it. Specific measures to reduce poverty within the
 urban sector are, first, giving the poor greater access to such basic public
 services as housing, water supply and sewerage, and, second, providing
 greater urban employment opportunities. Of the first category, only the
 programme of building low-cost houses is directed specifically at the
 urban poor, and the number of such houses built over the period 1971-
 75 (13,244) was much too small to make a significant impact. The other
 programmes in the first category had a target population which extend-
 ed beyond that of the poor, and the benefits accruing to the urban poor
 could not have been more than peripheral.
 The provision of greater urban employment opportunities has
 always been an objective of planning. However, the actual industrial
 policies pursued have not always been compatible with such an objective.
 Mention has often been made of the bias towards capital-intensive
 activities inherent in the 1958 Pioneer Industries Ordinance and the
 1968 Investment Incentives Act. In 1971, amendments were made to the
 latter to provide special incentives for employing more labour. This
 provision is known as the Labour Utilization Relief, where the duration
 of the exemption from the corporate tax depends on the number of
 workers employed. Thus, a company that can provide employment for
 51 to 100 employees on its production day can enjoy tax relief for two
 years, and the exemption can be extended to a third, fourth and fifth
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 year if the labour force is expanded to more than 100, 200 and 350
 employees, respectively. Prima facie evidence suggests, however, that the
 effect of the Labour Utilization Relief may not be significant.
 The provision that the duration of the tax holiday varies directly with
 the employment level, subject to a qualifying level of 51 employees,
 means that the scheme is biased, a priori, towards the bigger enterprises.
 In 1972, the year of the most recent industrial census, the number of
 establishments that employed more than 50 workers each was only 700,
 or just 6 per cent of the total number of manufacturing establishments
 in Peninsular Malaysia. The imposition of a qualifying employment level
 of 50 workers before any subsidy is granted effectively excludes numer-
 ous small-scale family concerns from the scheme. Also, given that larger
 firms tend also to be the more capital-intensive ones, the result of
 introducing the Labour Utilization Relief may well have been the
 establishment of large and capital-intensive firms.
 These criticisms of the programme to eradicate urban poverty are
 given weight by the fact that the incidence of poverty only decreased
 from 21.3 to 19.0 per cent. The programme differed only in degree, and
 not in kind, with policies implemented before 1970. Had the pro-
 gramme been directed more at the poverty groups themselves, or had
 the same policies simply been implemented on a wider scale, the
 government would have enjoyed greater success in this area.
 A general criticism of the programme to eradicate rural and urban
 poverty is that they have increased the inequality in income distribution.
 Table 1 shows the ratio of the mean to the median monthly household
 incomes by race and geographical location in Peninsular Malaysia over
 the period 1970-79. An increase in the ratio signifies a worsening in the
 inequality in income distribution. It can be seen that, while the average
 TABLE 1. RATIO OF MEAN TO MEDIAN REAL MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOMES
 IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA, 1970-79 (1970 PRICES)
 1970 1973 1976 1979
 Peninsular
 Malaysia 1.59 1.60 1.64 1.70
 Urban 1.62 1.66 1.67 1.83
 Rural 1.44 1.47 1.49 1.54
 Malay 1.43 1.48 1.48 1.54
 Chinese 1.47 1.56 1.64 1.72
 Indian 1.59 1.47 1.49 1.49
 Others 3.25 3.66 3.22 3.42
 Source: Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85, p. 56.
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 real monthly household income of the urban, rural, Malay, Chinese, and
 total populations had increased over the period, this was accompanied
 by a worsening in the inequality in income distribution. The incidence of
 poverty has been reduced, but this has been achieved at the cost of an
 increase in income inequality in most sections of the population. It is not
 a case of the "rich getting richer and the poor poorer," but rather one of
 the "poor getting less poor, and the rich much richer."
 (3) Restructuring Society. Given the growth and not the redistributive
 strategy of the New Economic Policy, it is possible to determine the
 required proportion of the new wealth and jobs that must accrue to the
 different racial groups in order to obtain the various distributional
 targets by 1990.3 The formula for working this out is given as:
 i 1
 (+ g)l (J + g)fn=
 where i is the initial Malay participation share in wealth or employment,
 p the Malay participation rate in the increment, g the annual growth rate
 of wealth accumulation or employment, n the time-period, and t the
 wealth distribution or employment composition target. The formula
 shows that, for a given time period n, the higher is i and g the easier it is,
 through a lower p, to achieve any target t. It is possible also to work out
 the implicit phasing of the wealth and employment targets over the
 period 1971-90, once values for g and p are determined. For example, if
 g is given as 10 per cent for the whole of the period, then p is 35.24 per
 cent, and the Malays and Malay interests must own 14.8, 22.4, 27.2 and
 30.0 per cent of all corporate stock by 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1990,
 respectively.
 From the data available in the Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80, it
 would appear that the wealth-target for 1975 for Peninsular Malaysia
 was not achieved. The average annual growth rate of the corporate stock
 for the period 1971-75 was 13.2 per cent. With a value of 13.2 per cent
 for g and, therefore, one of 32.52 per cent for p, t in 1975 should have
 been 14.4 per cent. The actual share achieved by Malays and Malay
 interests was 7.8 per cent-significantly below the target. This does not,
 of course, mean that the wealth target for 1990 cannot be achieved; but
 it does mean that the growth of the corporate stock would have to be
 significantly greater than 13.2 per cent per annum for the rest of the
 period.
 3 This formula is taken from R. Thillainathan, "The Second Malaysia Plan: Notes on
 the Objectives of Balanced Distribution of Wealth and Employment," Kajian Ekonomr
 Malaysia (December 1970), pp. 57-71.
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 An equally important implication is that there must be even greater
 dependence on public enterprises holding share capital in trust for the
 bumiputera population. Even before the shortfall occurred, it was
 evident that the public enterprises were going to have to play the major
 role in fulfilling the wealth-target. The low income of the Malays and
 their correspondingly low propensity to accumulate capital meant that
 many of the shares reserved for Malays in private enterprises could not
 be taken up by bumiputera individuals or firms. They had to be held in
 trust by such statutory bodies as MARA (Majlis Amanah Rakyat),
 PERNAS (Perbadanan Nasional Berhad), UDA (Urban Development
 Authority), SEDCs (State Economic Development Corporations), Bank
 Bumiputra, BPMB (Bank Pembangunan Malaysian Berhad), FIMA
 (Food Industries of Malaysia Sendirian Berhad), and PNB (Pelaburan
 Nasional Berhad). The expectation that it would be "bumiputera trust
 agencies" rather than "bumiputera individuals" that would spearhead
 the wealth restructuring prong of the NEP is borne out by Table 2. The
 shortfall in achieving the implicit 1975 target of a 14.4 per cent Malay
 share must place still greater emphasis on the role of the public
 enterprises in holding corporate shares in trust for the Malays.
 There are certain dangers in such a development. The first is the
 greatly increased role of the state in the economy, with possible adverse
 effects on private investment because of the uncertainty and fear
 created: witness, for example, the adverse effects that the passing of the
 Industrial Co-ordination Act and the Petroleum Development (Amend-
 ment) Act in April 1975 had on direct foreign investment. A second
 danger is the economic inefficiency that can arise from the concentration
 of even more economic power under bureaucratic control. There is no
 TABLE 2. PENINSULAR MALAYSIA: OWNERSHIP OF SHARE CAPITAL IN LIMITED
 COMPANIES, 1970-75
 Average
 1970 1975 annual
 growth
 $ million % $ million % rate (%)
 Malays and Malay Interests 125.6 2.4 768.1 7.8 43.6
 Malay individuals 84.4 1.6 227.1 2.3 21.9
 Malay interests 41.2 0.8 541.0 5.5 67.4
 Other Malaysians 1,826.5 34.3 3,687.3 37.3 15.1
 Foreigners 3,377.1 63.3 5,434.7 54.9 10.0
 Total private sector 5,329.2 100.0 9,890.1 100.0 13.2
 Source: Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, p. 86.
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 guarantee that state enterprises will be run with economic efficiency. In
 fact, the economic losses suffered by some of them (e.g., UDA) suggest
 that the exact opposite may be true. Senior managers are usually
 politicians or civil servants on secondment and may not necessarily owe
 allegiance to the statutory bodies they head. Their tasks may be made
 more difficult and sometimes impossible by the lack of specified goals
 and by the presence of powerful ex-officio members of the board which
 may hamper critical analysis and rational decision-making. In any case,
 politicians and civil servants do not necessarily make good businessmen,
 nor are they immune to the temptations that inevitably arise from the
 rapid concentration of economic power in the hands of a small group of
 people. All these problems will be compounded if the process of
 concentration is accelerated.
 If private investment slows down and there is gross economic
 inefficiency in the operation of the state enterprises, their economic
 growth and the growth of the corporate sector will be adversely affected.
 The slowing down of g will require a higher Malay share of the increase
 in the stock of wealth (p), which then requires an increase in the activities
 of the statutory bodies-which may further slow down the rate of
 growth of the corporate stock. Eventually, we may reach a stage where
 the growth strategy is abandoned in favour of a redistributive strategy.
 Another important consequence of an increasing concentration of
 economic power under bureaucratic control, and of the restructuring
 strategy of the NEP in general, is the growing inequality in the
 distribution of income and wealth within the bumiputera community.
 The majority of the shares reserved for the bumiputera community that
 are bought are in fact purchased by the richer members of the
 community. The purchase of shares to be held in trust for the poor
 bumiputera individuals not only increases the power of the relatively
 small number of bumiputera politicians and civil servants in charge of
 statutory bodies, but also boosts their income very considerably. That
 there was such an increase in income inequality within the Malay
 community over the period 1970-79 is revealed in Table 1. This
 growing inequality is inevitable in the short run under the restructuring
 strategy of the NEP. The fear is that it will persist or even worsen in the
 long run. Without tight supervision, the trustees of the assets may come
 to administer them on their own behalf or on behalf of their friends and
 relatives-rather than on behalf of the alleged beneficiaries, the Malay
 poor. It may be a case of "so near, and yet so far" for the Malay poor,
 and this may well lead to an erosion of their political support which the
 NEP was intended to increase in the first place.
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 The employment-composition target of the New Economic Policy
 requires that the employment pattern by sector and occupation be more
 reflective of the racial composition of the population by the year 1990.
 By using the estimated employment growth-rates for 1970-90 from the
 Third Malaysia Plan, we can calculate, through formula (1), the percent-
 age of the new jobs created that must be taken up by the various racial
 groups in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. In Table 3, these
 are compared to the figures actually realized for the period, 1970-75.
 It can be seen that significant divergences exist between the intended
 and the actual percentage shares in the three sectors. In the case of the
 agricultural sector, the actual shares of the Malays and the Indians were
 much higher than the required shares, while those of the Chinese were
 well below. In the secondary sector, the actual shares of the Malays in the
 new jobs created were below those required, while in the tertiary sector
 they were slightly below. As a result of these divergences, the fulfillment
 of the employment restructuring target by sector by 1990 must require,
 for the remainder of the period, a much faster rate of movement of
 Malays from rural to urban areas and of non-Malays from urban to rural
 areas. Unless the economy and employment grow much faster and
 important changes in net emigration among the racial groups take place,
 it appears most unlikely that the employment composition target will be
 achieved by 1990.
 Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-80
 (1) Economic Growth. The target set for the real GDP was an average
 annual growth rate of 8.4 per cent, which was well above the 7.1 per cent
 per annum accomplished under the Second Malaysia Plan. The growth-
 rate achieved was 8.6 per cent. In terms of expenditure, the main
 impetus for growth in the first part of the plan period (1976-78) came
 from public investment and consumption. Public investment increased
 by 8.3 per cent per annum, as against the target rate of 6.2 per cent per
 annum. If the investment undertaken by the Malaysian Airline System
 (MAS) and the Malaysian International Shipping Corporation (MISC)
 had been excluded, then public investment would have grown even
 faster at 10.0 per cent per annum. Private investment was targeted to
 increase at 9.9 per cent per annum, but what was actually achieved was a
 growth rate of 7.1 per cent per annum. In the second part of the plan
 period (1978-80), the external sector demand increased very markedly,
 producing an average annual growth-rate in private investment of 13.6
 per cent over the whole of the plan period-much higher than the 9.3
 per cent recorded in public investment.
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 PENINSULAR MALAYSIA
 Actual Percentages of New Jobs Taken
 Targeted Percentages of New
 Jobs to be Taken, 1970-90 1970-75 1975-80 1970-80
 Sector Malays Chinese Indians Malays Chinese Indians Malays Chinese Indians Malays Chinese Indians
 Primary 37.8 54.4 7.7 75.3 15.5 9.2 17.7 30.6 51.7 57.8 20.1 22.1
 Secondary 64.6 25.4 9.7 46.4 40.6 13.0 50.6 43.6 5.8 48.7 42.2 9.1
 Tertiary 54.9 33.3 11.1 47.4 41.7 10.9 57.9 31.3 10.8 52.7 36.4 10.9
 Sources: Targeted figures are from R. Thillainathan, "The Twenty-Year Plan for Restructuring Employment in Peninsular Malaysia," Kaplan Ekonomi
 Malaysia (December 1977). Actual figures are from Fourth Malaysia Plan, 1981-85, p. 59.
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 The major source of capital formation over the entire plan period
 was therefore in line with expectation, which was that it should come
 from the private sector. The evidence shows that this was fortuitous to a
 certain extent. The Mid-Term Review of the plan commented that the
 public sector provided a "counter-cyclical impact on the economy which
 was marked by relatively slow growth in private investment in 1976 and
 by weak export growth in 1977" (p. 5). The review admitted that the
 introduction of the Industrial Co-ordination Act and the Petroleum
 Development Act had to some degree contributed to this problem. In
 terms of the analysis presented earlier, it may be argued that the rapid
 expansion of the power of the bureaucracy has reduced the confidence
 of private investors and so produced a shortfall in the level of private
 investment. The response of the government has been to increase the
 level of public investment by increasing the funding of statutory bodies
 involved in acquiring assets on the behalf of Malays. The beginnings of a
 vicious circle might well have been avoided more by luck than judgment.
 (2) Poverty Eradication. The overall incidence of poverty in Peninsu-
 lar Malaysia declined from 43.9 per cent in 1975 to 29.2 per cent in
 1980. In the agricultural sector, the decline was from 63.0 to 46.1 per
 cent; in the non-agricultural sector, it was from 26.2 to 16.8 per cent. In
 the urban sector, the decline was from 19.0 to 12.6 per cent. The
 programmes implemented to bring about this improvement in the
 economic welfare of the rural and urban poor in the period 1976-78
 were basically the same as those used in the period of the Second
 Malaysia Plan, 1971-75. As such, they are subject to the same type of
 criticism. In the rural areas they did not deal significantly with the
 fundamental problem of landlessness: there was no attempt to reform
 the land-tenure system in non-FELDA acreage, and the comprehensive
 and expensive "captive" FELDA approach did not permit a faster rate of
 land development. In the urban areas, specific programmes aimed at the
 urban poor were few, and tax incentives continued to favour large-scale
 and capital-intensive enterprises. Income distribution continued to
 become more unevenly distributed (Table 1).
 (3) Restructuring Society. The corporate stock in Malaysia for 1975-80
 increased at an average annual growth-rate of 14.9 per cent. The
 implicit ownership target for Malays and Malay interests for 1980-
 given such a growth rate, an implied participation-rate of 32.97 per cent,
 and an initial (1975) Malay ownership share of 9.2 per cent-was much
 higher than the 12.4 per cent share actually achieved. This shortfall can
 be eliminated and the target of 30 per cent by 1990 be achieved only by
 stepping up very significantly the purchase of shares to be held in trust
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 by statutory bodies-which will, of course, exacerbate the tendency
 towards greater bureaucratic control. Over the period 1971-80, corpo-
 rate wealth in the hands of bumiputera individuals increased by 23.5 per
 cent per annum, while that in the hands of bumiputera trust agencies
 went up by 39.0 per cent per annum. This disparity in favour of the
 latter will now probably be accentuated.
 The actual shares of the total number of jobs created in 1975-80
 going to the various racial groups are presented in Table 3. The table
 shows that the movements went only a little way to compensate for the
 massive divergences between the targeted shares and the actual shares in
 the period 1970-75. The actual percentages of new jobs held by the
 three racial groups at the mid-way stage of the New Economic Policy
 period suggest that the achievement of the employment composition
 target by 1990 may not be possible. The results obtained so far suggest
 either that changes in composition have to be less drastic in all sectors or
 that the target date must be moved back. The employment composition
 target is in fact much more difficult to achieve than the wealth target.
 While more and more shares can be held in trust for the Malay poor by a
 few unit trusts for a manageable outlay, the same cannot be said of
 expanding the employment function of the government.
 CONCLUSIONS
 Our assessment of development planning in Malaysia over the period
 1950-80 shows that it achieved the target rates of economic growth and
 reduced the incidence of poverty. However, the record also shows that
 the restructuring programme fell behind schedule significantly and that
 income distribution had worsened.
 The Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-85, claims that it will continue the
 strategy adopted in the previous two plans in implementing the New
 Economic Policy. However, it is highly unlikely that such an approach
 can fulfill the restructuring objective of the programme. The second
 decade of the New Economic Policy must see a marked increase in the
 role of the public sector in the restructuring programme if the opera-
 tional targets are to be achieved.
 This will further increase the bureaucratic control of the economy.
 Until now, this process has had no marked adverse effect on economic
 growth. However, the situation may change as the easy phase of
 "government substitution" comes to an end. There is also the possibility
 of a precautionary discounting of potential investment returns on the
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 part of the private sector. This will then necessitate further government
 intervention, producing further shortfalls in private investment-and so
 on, in a vicious circle.
 It is also highly unlikely that the trend towards increasing uneven-
 ness in income distribution will be arrested. In the past, this was perhaps
 not as politically important an issue as it was made out to be. In the
 beginning, so long as the poorest of the poor were provided their basic
 needs, as was done in programmes to reduce the incidence of poverty,
 the rural electorate remained content. Once these basic needs were
 provided, however, the recipients became more concerned about relative
 poverty or affluence, and the issue of increasing income inequality
 became more pressing. The Fourth Malaysia Plan obviously does not see
 the mid-way stage of the New Economic Policy period as a watershed in
 this respect, as its prescription is to have more of the same medicine.
 This suggests either political fine-tuning or political brinksmanship of
 the highest order.
 Griffith University, Australia, June 1982
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